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Abstract—Modern cyber-physical systems are enabled by 
electronic hardware and embedded systems. The security of these 
sub-components is a concern during the design and operational 
phases of cyber-physical system life cycles. Compromised 
electronics can result in mission-critical failures, unauthorized 
access, and other severe consequences. As systems become more 
complex and feature greater connectivity, system owners must 
make decisions regarding how to mitigate risks and ensure 
resilience and trust. This paper provides an overview of research 
efforts related to assessing and managing risks, resilience, and 
trust with an emphasis on electronic hardware and embedded 
systems. The research takes a decision-oriented perspective, 
drawing from the perspectives of scenario planning and portfolio 
analysis, and describes examples related to the risk-based 
prioritization of cyber assets in large-scale systems.  
Keywords— system security, hardware assurance, security, risk, 
vulnerability, threats, mission assurance, cybersecurity, supply 
chain, decision making.   
I. INTRODUCTION  
The national and global infrastructure is increasingly 
dependent upon embedded electronic hardware components. 
Whereas we used to be able to think of physical and cyber 
systems as separate entities, we now must reframe our thinking 
in terms of cyber-physical systems. The U.S. National Institute 
of Standards and Technology [1] defines cyber-physical systems 
as “smart systems that include engineered interacting networks 
of physical and computational components”. Cyber-physical 
systems encompass a broad scope, sometimes conceptualized as 
having cyber, physical, and human dimensions [2]-[3].  
As an example, modern vehicles contain hundreds of 
embedded sensors and control units, millions of lines of code, 
and Internet access [4]. While these hardware components and 
embedded systems add many useful functionalities, they also 
present vulnerabilities which can potentially allow malicious 
actors to steal and/or remotely access and control the vehicle [5]-
[7]. Other applications related to healthcare, finance, defense, 
and critical infrastructure (e.g., the electric grid [8]-[9]) are 
similarly vulnerable, and necessitate the assessment of the 
security and trust of the embedded hardware which facilitate our 
daily lives [10]. 
The supply chains through which these components are 
procured and transported can be an entry point for untrusted and 
insecure electronics, making their way to the consumer. 
Counterfeit electronics, which may be relabeled, refurbished, or 
repackaged to misrepresent their authenticity, can make their 
way into the supply chain and can be created through a number 
of simple and advanced methods [11]-[13].  
If counterfeit electronic components are integrated into 
products, a number of consequences can materialize, including 
reduced system functionality and unauthorized access to 
sensitive information. Companies face impacts in the form of 
lost profits, increased testing and repair costs, damaged 
reputation, products with decreased reliability, and legal 
liabilities [14]. Governments face even more serious issues, such 
as the possibility of reduced reliability and functionality of 
mission-critical defense systems [15]. One estimate of the 
monetary impact of counterfeits on the semiconductor industry 
in the United States is as high as $200 billion [16].   
Many factors contribute to the abundance of counterfeits 
within the supply chain, including the changing nature of the 
supply chain itself. Outsourcing of the fabrication of electronic 
components and the complex nature of the global electronics 
supply chain necessitates the authentication of components 
where the chain of custody may be unknown [17]-[19]. 
Obsolescence is another contributing factor, especially in 
sectors such as defense and aviation where systems are in service 
for longer life spans than the components from which they are 
comprised. The obsolescence caused through diminishing 
manufacturing sources and material shortages (DMSMS) means 
that components must sometimes be procured from untrusted 
sources, opening the door for counterfeits [20]-[25]. Finally, 
end-of-life considerations, including  electronic waste (e-waste) 
disposal practices, contribute to the prevalence of counterfeits 
[26]. 
While ideally all electronics would be purchased from 
trusted suppliers, the reality of the modern global supply chain 
is that this is not always possible. Components with unknown 
supply chain histories require testing and authentication 
techniques to ensure that the required levels of security and trust 
are met. How to make risk-informed decisions under this 
environment of uncertainty is a critical managerial task from a 
supply chain and risk management perspective.   
In this paper, we describe research efforts at the system and 
application level. We describe cyber-physical systems research 
efforts in areas related to risk, resilience, and trust, as well as 
open challenges. A comprehensive cyber-physical systems 
security strategy is one which integrates analytics, modeling 
methods, business processes, and technological advances across 
all levels of the system hierarchy and across the entire system 
life cycle. 
II. EXAMPLE: ELECTRONIC VEHICLE CHARGING STATIONS 
Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology, including the charging 
stations, electric vehicles, power and transportation networks, 
and control systems represent complex cyber-physical systems 
[27]-[30]. Connected vehicle systems and associated V2G 
infrastructure elements are increasingly subject to security 
threats, including security of embedded hardware devices [27]. 
V2G technology enables fleet-vehicle batteries to provide 
frequency regulation (distributed shock absorption on the scale 
of milliseconds to seconds) to the power grid when they would 
otherwise be on stand-by for logistics operations. Several-
minute intervals of battery availability at specified power 
throughputs are reserved and sold ahead in an e-commerce 
market. In addition to frequency regulation, V2G technology 
can also provide demand charge management, reducing a 
customer’s monthly demand charge (which can make up a 
significant portion of a site’s electricity bill) by discharging an 
EV to partially power other assets, such as a building.  
There is an opportunity for IoT systems integration 
(including manufacturing) of advanced chargers, network 
communications, fleet vehicles, batteries, and the associated e-
commerce transactions among power utilities and their 
industrial customers. A software system that enables 
interoperability between EVs, chargers, the grid, and other 
energy assets (solar, wind, etc.) is a critical component of V2G 
technology. Once these components are installed on a 
customer’s site, an operations management system can 
continuously analyze and execute optimal V2G monetization 
opportunities available given a fleet’s logistic operating 
schedule.  
The most important of these properties, and perhaps most 
worrying to industry, is the possibility of a cascading failure 
following an attack or failure of electronic hardware. Is has been 
shown for a simple coupled network model that cascading 
failure effects lead to a drastic decrease in the number of links 
and nodes that need to be removed from the network to break it 
down into individual components [31]-[32]. Ganin et al. have 
illustrated a similar effect for system recovery after failure [33]. 
III. RISK, RESILIENCE, AND TRUST 
Risk analysis has been historically focused on answering 
questions about what can go wrong, what is the likelihood of 
something going wrong, and what are the impacts in the case of 
the thing going wrong [34]. At the highest level of system 
abstraction, risks can be associated with embedded hardware in 
terms of technical, operational, and programmatic perspectives. 
Technical risks are related to the intended functionality of the 
system, whereas operational risks and programmatic risks are 
related to the achievement of business and program objectives, 
such as meeting cost and schedule benchmarks [35].  
DiMase et al. described how supply chain risk management 
is only a segment of the larger and more complex issue of cyber-
physical security [36]. They defined ten areas of concern, from 
software assurance to life cycle management, each with its own 
regulatory governing bodies and guidance documents. They 
described the need to take a systems view of the cyber physical 
security challenge, including a view of how security 
requirements flow down from operational, functional, and 
architectural system levels. In particular, perspectives from 
systems engineering and closely related disciplines such as risk 
analysis and decision analysis are needed to synthesize and 
integrate information across areas of concern and guide 
enterprise level decisions [36]. In addition, they mention 
multiple cross-cutting capabilities, such as decision analysis, 
risk analysis, education and outreach, and training, highlighting 
how security is a transdisciplinary problem, requiring expertise 
from an array of subject domains [36]-[37].  
One of the major difficulties related to assessing the risks of 
counterfeit electronics in the global supply chain has been the 
lack of obtainable data regarding the prevalence of counterfeits. 
Moreover, situations where there are low-likelihood and high-
consequence risks have been difficult for risk practitioners to 
contend with historically [38]-[40]. Furthermore, not all security 
requirements can be tested for complicated systems, meaning 
that there will always be some undetected risk [41].  
These concerns have led to some researchers to describe 
cyber resilience, where resilience is defined by The National 
Academy of Science as “the ability to prepare and plan for, 
absorb, recover from, or more successfully adapt to actual or 
potential adverse events” [42]. The National Research Council 
describes a resilient system as “one whose performance 
degrades gradually rather than catastrophically when its other 
defensive mechanisms are insufficient to stem an attack. A 
resilient system will still continue to perform some of its 
intended functions, although perhaps more slowly or for fewer 
people or with fewer applications. Features of resilient systems 
include redundancies and the absence of single points of failure” 
[43]. With respect to cyber resilience, “cyber resilience (or 
resiliency) is the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, 
and adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or 
compromises on cyber resources. Cyber resiliency can be a 
capability of a system, a system-of-systems, a mission, a 
business function, an organization, or a cross-organizational 
mission; the term can also be applied to an individual, 
household, group, region, or nation” [44]. Sheffi [45] proposed 
supply chain resilience, which promotes the resilience paradigm 
in terms of building adaptability and the ability to bounce back 
from disruptions and stressors. 
Several frameworks for cyber resilience have been proposed 
[46]-[49]. Bodeau and Graubert [49] described the field of cyber 
resiliency engineering as an interdisciplinary exercise founded 
upon systems engineering, and drawing principles from allied 
topics including dependability, survivability, fault tolerance, 
contingency planning, and others. Linkov et al. [50] developed 
a matrix-based approach for the development of cyber resilience 
metrics, based on the stages of the event management cycle 
(Plan/Prepare, Absorb, Recover, Adapt) and operational 
domains (Physical, Information, Cognitive, Social). This 
resilience metrics development process was applied to industrial 
control systems [51].  
A final related concept is trust. Trust in the context of cyber 
security has been defined in multiple ways, including the 
“qualified reliance on received information” [52]. In the context 
of supply chains, the concept of trust is similar. Trust is 
conceptualized as a belief held by an actor in the supply chain, 
that another actor will act consistently and do what they say that 
they will do [53]. Trust is related to reciprocity between parties, 
the alignment of purposes, consequences for breaking trust, and 
transparency of information shared between parties [54]. Mayer 
et al. [55] summarizes trust as “the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party.”   
IV. RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING IN CYBER-PHYSICAL 
SUPPLY CHAINS 
Increasingly, hardware supply chains have been evolving 
toward supply webs, moving away from linear procurement and 
toward ecosystems that have been characterized as “dynamic, 
hyper-connected, and collaborative” [56]. Managing risks 
within these complex supply chains is a top industrial priority 
and focuses mainly on avoidance and mitigation of 
consequences associated with disruption events, as well as 
balancing expected losses with risk management costs [57]-[59]. 
Teng, Thekdi, and Lambert [60]-[61] described program risk as 
the process of answering the questions:  
• what are the scope of risks to be addressed;  
• what are the allocations of resources across time, 
geography, topics;  
• and how do we monitor the efficacy of risk 
management into the future.  
 
Fig. 1. Prioritizatoin of cyber-physical assets across multiple disruptive 
scenarios of emergent and future conditions to support decision making.  
Security and risk management need to go beyond the system 
boundary, looking toward the wider system of business 
processes and logistics networks, deriving relevant decision 
making parameters related to the broader hardware supply chain 
including specific resilience-enhancing initiatives and their 
relevant benefits, costs, and time constraints. Research is needed 
on methods, metrics, and testbeds for risk analysis of IOT 
devices and logistics systems, with the goal to develop risk 
analysis methods and decision making approaches along with 
relevant economic indicators for hardware networks and supply 
chains [51].  
Principles and methods of scenario building can be 
leveraged, considering emergent and future conditions 
involving environment, regulation, technology innovation, 
markets and economics, population and workforce behaviors, 
and other factors, both individually and in combination as 
scenarios, as demonstrated in [62]-[64]. For each of several risk 
scenarios of emergent conditions, a comprehensive risk analysis 
methodology would elicit from experts the increases or 
decreases in importance of criteria to rank IOT devices and 
systems of concern. With assessments of each device relative to 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence criteria, the system 
analyst or manager would be able to study the sensitivity of 
device criticality rankings to the scenarios, supportive of 
continuous adaptation and improvement toward industry aims.  
The analysis would assist to determine what scenarios or 
combinations of risk scenarios are influential for critical 
embedded hardware components in a large-scale system. With 
this risk-based information, governments, scientific experts, 
policy-makers and various other stakeholders can make 
evidence-based strategic decisions leading to robust adaptive 
management of cyber security within complex interconnected 
systems and balance benefits, costs, and risks.  
An open area of research related to decision making is that 
of metrics for security. Rostami et al. [65] proposed several 
technical metrics for security of hardware components against a 
variety of attacks. Hagen et al. [66] propose four metrics for 
assessing the performance of testing laboratories including 
effectiveness, efficiency, capacity, and capability. However, a 
unified framework for metric development across the various 
levels of system hierarchy and abstraction has not been 
developed. 
V. RESOURCE ALLOCATION TO PORTFOLIOS OF SECURITY 
MEASURES 
The risks posed by counterfeit electronics are numerous, and 
there exist a large number of potential risk mitigation measures 
which one can implement for a given system or across the 
enterprise. The task of identifying what specific 
countermeasures are used to reduce risk of counterfeit hardware 
is complicated by the many potential options available. While 
one can take a “defense in depth” approach and implement many 
safeguards, the question remains as to which ones in particular 
accrue the most security and trust benefits at the lowest cost. 
Each mitigation has associated with it a certain effectiveness in 
mitigating risks, but also comes at a cost. Moreover, mitigations 
can be implemented in combination with one another. These 
decisions must balance the inputs and concerns from upper 
management and organizational department such as supply 
chain management, finance, and IT.  
The resulting question is that for a given level of risk 
reduction and a certain budget, what is the optimal investment 
strategy, in the form of combinations of mitigations, to 
implement? 
The risk reduction benefits of diversification are well known. 
In particular, risk can be decomposed into two components – 
systematic and idiosyncratic (also called specific, or 
nonsystematic) risk. Through a well-diversified portfolio, much 
of the idiosyncratic risk can be reduced [67-68]. For example, 
Zhou et al. [69] applied a portfolio approach to flood risk 
management infrastructure. Instead of each asset being a 
financial security (e.g., a stock), they modeled the returns from 
the implementation of various infrastructure assets such as 
retention areas, levees, etc. They found that diversification of 
flood risk management infrastructure in an area reduced the 
losses associated with floods.  
In the same way, supply chain managers and risk managers 
require portfolio tools which can support cost-effective decision 
making through the development of a portfolio tool which aids 
the risk management investment decision process. Namely, 
methods and tools are needed which address the optimal “mix” 
of risk reduction countermeasures given several user-defined 
inputs related to cost and target risk. The goal is for users to 
investigate how to “buy down” the risk to acceptable levels.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
As electronic hardware and embedded systems become more 
prevalent within the systems on which we depend in our daily 
lives, methodologies which provide risk-, resilience-, and trust-
based insights into the system life cycle will become more 
important to the organizations tasked with maintaining a secure 
operating environment. While much research has been done on 
the chip, board, and assembly levels, research at the application 
and system level is required which integrates the technical risks 
with considerations related to business processes and human 
factors. 
Another need faced by industry and government is the 
training of the current and future workforce to address these 
dynamic security issues. Training for the current enterprise 
workforce includes personnel beyond traditional IT 
professionals, and includes management and horizontally 
integrated personnel such as contractors. In terms of training the 
next generation workforce, institutions must provide 
educational curricula, hands-on experiential learning 
environments, and training opportunities that meet the needs of 
industry and government stakeholders [70].  
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